Vladimir Tismaneanu, The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism,
and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
2012 (part)
THE ENIGMA OF TOTALITARIANISM
Herein lies the essence and mystery of the
totalitarian experiences of the twentieth century: The
complete rejection of all barriers and all restraints that politics,
civilization, morality, religion, natural feelings of compassion, and universal
ideas of fraternity have constructed in order to moderate, repress, or
sublimate the human potential for individual and collective violence. The real
similarities between the Communist and Fascist experiments (the crucial role of
the party, the preeminence of ideology, the ubiquitous secret police, the
fascination with technology, the frenzied cult of the New Man,the
quasi-religious celebration of the charismatic leader) should not blur
significant distinctions (one being the absence of Nazi show trials or
intraparty permanent purges). Nevertheless, historian Eugen Weber judiciously
remarked that the distinction between fascism and communism is relative rather
than absolute, dynamic rather than fundamental. Under the circumstances, one
cannot help but ask the same question as Weber. Isn't this fundamental
similarity between totalitarian creeds and systems at least as important as
their differences of view? This book
engages in a dialogue with the most influential contributions to these morally
and politically urgent questions. The twentieth century was plagued by
agonizing ideological polarizations whose effects continue to haunt our times.
I agree with political
scientist Pierre Hassner that despite the differences between Stalinism and
Nazism, their fundamental and defining common characteristic was their
genocidal frenzy. Or, to use Sheila Fitzpatrick and Michael Geyer's
formulation, The phenomenon of the gulag as a manifestation of Soviet state
violence and the Holocaust as the central site of Nazi terror conveys the
unmistakable message that the two regimes were bent on genocide [my italics]. On the one hand, both Stalinism and Nazism
looked for objective enemies
and operated with notions of collective, even genetic guilt. Obviously, the
Bolshevik vision stigmatized political sins, whereas the Nazi Weltanschauung
reified biological distinctions. In his enormously significant toast of
November 7, 1937, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Bolshevik
coup, as recorded by the Comintern leader Georgi Dimitrov and in his diary, a
speech meant to be known only by the top party and People's Commissariat for
Internal Affairs (NKVD) elite, Stalin said,Whoever
attempts to destroy the unity of the socialist state, whoever seeks the
separation of any of its parts or nationalitiesthat
man is an enemy, a sworn enemy of the peoples of the USSR. And we will destroy
each and every such enemy, even if he was an old Bolshevik; we will destroy all
his kin, his family. We will mercilessly destroy anyone who, by his deeds or
his thoughts,yes, his thoughtsthreatens
the unity of the socialist state. To the complete destruction of all enemies,
themselves and their kin! (Approving exclamations: To the great Stalin!)
At the same, the party
apparatus never played as powerful a role in Nazi Germany as it did in Stalin's
Russia. In fact, Hitler envied Stalin for having been able to place political
officers as ideological watchdogs in the army. Historian Ian Kershaw stresses
the fact that even when Martin Bormann took over the party leadership in May
1941, thus bringing the Nazi Party's interference and scope for intervention in
shaping the direction of policy to a new plane, the internal contradictions and
incoherencies of the National Socialist state remained. The Nazi Party (NSDAP) never enjoyed the same
charismatic status that the Bolshevik vanguard had acquired. In Hitler's
Germany, loyalty belonged to the FΓΌhrer as the embodiment of the pristine
vΓΆlkisch community. In Stalin's Russia, the zealots
allegiances went to the leader to the extent that they saw him as the
incarnation of the party's wisdom.
When he maintained that
the cadres decided everything, Stalin really meant it (with him being the
ultimate arbiter of promotions and emotions): A
great deal is said about great leaders. But a cause is never won unless the
right conditions exist. And the main thing here is the middle cadres. They are
the ones who choose the leader, explain our positions to the masses, and ensure
the success of our cause. They don't try to climb above their station; you don't
even notice them. Generals can do nothing without an officer corps.
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