Harrison
Mark, “Stalin and Our Times”, Irish Association for Russian & East European
Studies, University College, 2003.
Does Stalin belong to history or the present day? Dead
only fifty years, he is alive enough that some still wish to condemn him. In a
recent interview Robert Conquest has asked us to note “‘a curious thing: Stalin
comes out worse than we thought … You wouldn’t think it possible.’ To Churchill’s
description of Stalin as unnatural, Conquest adds his own: unreal. [Stalin’s]
will–power proved strong enough to project the illusion around the world,
blinding the west to the true situation … In the end, it is Stalin's almost
pointless cruelty, and the stupidity of his apologists in the west, that lingers”
(“I Told You I Was Right”, Financial Times, 1 March 2003).
At the same
time others wish to bring him back. A poll of 1,600 adults conducted across
Russia in February and March 2003 to mark the anniversary of the dictator’s death
found that “53 percent of respondents approved of Stalin overall, 33 percent disapproved,
and 14 percent declined to state a position. Twenty percent of those polled agreed
with the statement that Stalin ‘was a wise leader who led the USSR to power and
prosperity,’ while the same number agreed that only a ‘tough leader’ could rule
the country under the circumstances in which Stalin found himself. Only 27 percent
agreed that Stalin was ‘a cruel, inhuman tyrant responsible for the deaths of millions,’
and a similar percentage agreed that the full truth about him is not yet known”
(“More Than Half of All Russians Positive About Stalin”, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Newsline, 5 March 2003). Thus despite the best efforts of Conquest
and many others the “unknown Stalin” is still with us. After
sitting silently through my economic history course this year, a young Russian
student told me she registered for the class expecting an advantage of prior
knowledge gained from her background. Instead, she found how little she knew.
Perhaps, however, the failure of Stalin’s
criminality to pervade popular consciousness is not so surprising. Many may find
it hard to accommodate to the information that a monster effected evil
pointlessly and on an incredible scale. Some may find it, well, incredible.
Others who are willing to accept it as a fact do not know how to integrate it
into their understanding of societies and human nature. A persistent fear among
those who give primacy to the moral tasks of history is that to understand a
little more may mean to condemn a little less. Rather than risk the contagion
of understanding they now prefer to mock: thus “to Conquest, the depravities of
the Stalin era and the wreckage of the Soviet Union resonate like someterrible
comedy”; Laughter and the Twenty Million is the subtitle of Martin Amis’s
recent Koba the Dread. A result of this is that the Stalin era remains
surreal and therefore incomprehensible. And this is all the more regrettable in
that Stalin will remain a figure of our times while there remain other secular
tyrannies of his type.
I have a
simple proposition: we can permit ourselves to understand a little more without
moral hazard. Moreover, those who wish then to condemn will find that, by having
condemned a little less at the outset, they may do so, if they wish, all the
more effectively in the end. The understanding that I advocate is derived from
studying the choices that rulers must make in the exercise of political power.
The principles are derived mainly from the political economy of rent–seeking
and game theory; they are not new and their spirit may be traced as far back as
Machiavelli; they incorporate the proposition that to win and accumulate
political power a ruler must use resources that may be combined in varying ways
that give different results, and so bring in the economic
ideas of optimal allocation and equilibrium. This
means, finally, that they also rest on
the idea of rational choice (e.g. Wintrobe, 1998). Inseparably
related to economics, rational choice theory is not always a popular cause even
among Nobel prize winning economists (e.g. Sen, 2002). It is often confused
sometimes with the idea of perfect rationality, that is, a rationality that commands
perfect knowledge of the present and future and never makes mistakes, and
sometimes with the idea of maximising a self–interest that is myopic or
excludes social interactions. But these are not necessary attributes of
rational choice. Rather, rational choice theory presents us with an intellectual
challenge: if people do what they want, subject to the resource and information
constraints that we can identify, and if we do not understand what they do,
then we are missing something important and we should not be satisfied to throw
up our hands.
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