Kiril Tomoff, “Shostakovich et al.” and THE IRON CURTAIN: Intellectual
Property and the Development
of a Soviet Strategy of Cultural Confrontation, 1948–1949
On May 12, 1948, New York moviegoers
picked their way through crowds o f p rotestors and counterdemonstrators to
watch t he new film announced a s a “semi-documentary spy drama,” Wil l iam A.
Wel lman’s The Iron
Curtain. As the
demonstrators outside came to blows and a few of them were hauled away by
police, the film’s audience settled in to what contemporaries t rying to
present an evenhanded account called a slowly moving drama, “competent enough,
carefull y photographed and directed.” Based on events that took pl ace in Ottawa
in 1945, much of the cloak and dagger s tory was shot on l ocation in the
Canadian capital .1 It centered around
the activities of Igor Gouzenko (played by Dana Andrews), a Soviet cipher clerk
stationed in Ottawa who defected to Canada in 1945, taking with him a sheaf of
documents that revealed Soviet espionage activities and the participation of
Canadians in efforts to uncover the secret of the atom bomb.2 Observant members o f t hat f irst
New York audience woul d h ave r ecognized— or woul d s oon come to r ecognize—a
number o f t ropes common to North American portrayals of the Soviet Union and
the cultural clash between the West and the
Soviet Union. They would not have been surprised to see the seductive cal l of
capital ism’s material comforts reach Gouzenko’s w ife (pl ayed by Gene Tierney)
in a continuation of a theme that stretched back to one of Hollywood’s first
portrayals of Soviets in the West, Ninotchka (Ernst Lubitsch, 1939). They would
see it again in a more dazzling remake, Silk Stockings (Rouben Moulian, 1957) and in countless
other cold war films. Certainly the alcoholic and depressed army officer ominously
recalled to Moscow would have struck familiar chords.3 And the film’s dark, shadowy, claustrophobic cinematography
was fast becoming a trademark of 20th Century Fox’s crime thriller
collaborations with the
FBI, not to
mention stock-in-trade for portrayals of the cold, bleak home of communism. Perhaps
less commonplace was the film’s soundtrack. Arranged and conducted by A lfred
Newman, the score consisted l argel y of music w ritten by the Soviet Union’s
most internationally renowned composers: Dmitrii Shostakovich, Sergei
Prokofiev, Aram Khachaturian, and Nikolai Miaskovskii. In otherwise bland
reviews of the f ilm, the music stood out.5 Otherwise, the film appears to have
paled in comparison to the drama of the events it docu-dramatized and the struggles
over whether it could be shown to the public, first in the United States and
then in the rest of the world. Immediately upon his defection, the real-life
Gouzenko needed nearly forty hours to convince the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police that his story— and the documents he carried with him—were authentic.
His defection was the first from a Soviet embassy and the first of any sort
after the war. It caused an international media sensation, resulted in twenty
Canadian espionage trials and a dozen convictions, gave impetus to J. Edgar
Hoover’s attack on American leftists, and this episode of defection was later
credited with nothing less than starting the cold war.6 Gouzenko himself went
into hiding under an assumed name near Toronto, occasionally making public
appearances in a dramatic hood to conceal his appearance. By 1948, he published
an account of his defection and collaborated on the film script for 20th
Century Fox.7 Gouzenko’s personal story is a dramatic one in which the film The
Iron Curtain plays only a small role.
The few film historians who have concentrated on The Iron Curtain have hail
ed i t a s “Hollywood’s f irst C ol d War movie” a nd a “premature a nticommunist
film,” arguing for fresh evaluations of its place in the history of Hollywood’s
political engagement in the struggle against the Soviet Union and suggesting
that the history of its overseas reception indicates the extent to which
government officials in Washington sought to mold international taste according
to their political agenda.8 While appreciating the role of the film in such
contexts, I suggest that Soviet reactions to the film reveal just as much about
Soviet strategies of cultural confrontation in the early cold war. In this
chapter, I analyze one particular strategy that the Soviets devised and
deployed to fight The Iron Curtain. This strategy was one among several,
but it is particularly important for
our understanding of the post–cold war world because it suggests how significantly
the cultural confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union
shaped the development of the international economic, cultural, and legal
system commonly attributed to p ost-1989 “global ization” b y r eveal ing S
oviet p articipation—through competition—in the Western s ystem f rom the very
beginning of the col d war.9 To wit, the echoes of The Iron Curtain affair can
be heard in areas as diverse as the nascent development of jurisprudence
regulating content on the Internet, the success of universal copyright
conventions, and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. The development of the
Soviet strategy for cultural confrontation that was deployed against The Iron
Curtain first in the United States and then in Europe
reveals a surprising reliance on non-Soviet representatives abroad for the
interpretation of the terms of cultural conflict, a high degree of practical f
lexibility in the pursuit of ideological goals, and a hubristic willingness to
engage the West in the West’s own terms. Soviet strategies of engagement were
crafted largely through the agency of lowranking Soviet officials and friends
from abroad, and they often proved successful in the short term and in the
arena of high artistic culture, as was the case in The Iron Curtain affair. But
accepting the West’s terms of conflict eventually proved fatal.
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